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I Am Against Us? Unpacking Cultural Differences in Ingroup Favoritism via Dialecticism

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Abstract

The authors proposed a novel explanation for cultural differences in ingroup favoritism (dialecticism) and tested this hypothesis across cultures/ethnicities, domains, and levels of analysis (explicit vs. implicit, cognitive vs. affective). Dialecticism refers to the cognitive tendency to tolerate contradiction and is more frequently found among East Asian than North American cultures. In Study 1, Chinese were significantly less positive, compared to European Americans, in their explicit judgments of family members. Study 2 investigated ingroup attitudes among Chinese, Latinos, and European Americans. Only Chinese participants showed significant in-group derogation, relative to the other groups, and dialecticism (Dialectical Self Scale) was associated with participants' in group attitudes. Study 3 manipulated dialectical versus linear lay beliefs; participants primed with dialecticism showed more negative, explicit ingroup attitudes. Although ingroup disfavoring tendencies were more prevalent among Chinese across studies, they may be a reflection of one's culturally based lay beliefs rather than deep-rooted negative feelings toward one's ingroup.

Keywords

ingroup derogation, ingroup favoritism, dialecticism, lay theories, East Asian cultural groups

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> If you ask me about Chinese politics, the culture, the people, I can go on for hours talking about everything that's negative. But I still love that place. . . .
>
> Jon, Chinese University of California, Berkeley student

Ingroup derogation remains an elusive paradox haunting the periphery of social psychology. As a counterintuitive phenomenon that apparently contradicts both expert and lay beliefs regarding the nature of ingroup favoritism and outgroup prejudice and discrimination, this anti-us tendency has received relatively little empirical investigation and inadequate explanation since its first empirical documentation more than half a century ago (Clark & Clark, 1947, as cited in Jost & Burgess, 2000; Fine & Bowers, 1984; Hewstone & Ward, 1985; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). We posit that a systematic study of ingroup attitudes across different cultural/ethnic groups, domains, and levels of analysis can provide insight into this intriguing phenomenon.

Our investigation emerges against the backdrop of traditional conceptions of ethnocentrism. Both history and mainstream psychology point to a general norm of favoring members of one's own social group and, complementarily, showing prejudice against those belonging to a different social group (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Although less work has been undertaken on this topic, the literature also has documented the seemingly counterintuitive phenomenon of ingroup derogation. To illustrate, Chinese participants in Malaysia made outgroup-favoring and ingroup-disfavoring attributions (i.e., explained a Chinese actor's negative behavior via internal dispositions but positive behavior via the situation; Hewstone & Ward, 1985), East Asian children in Scotland preferred Scottish faces to their own ethnic physiognomies (Jahoda, Thompson, & Bhatt, 1972), Chinese students in Hong Kong exhibited less ingroup favoritism relative to British students (Bond & Hewstone, 1988), and Chinese routinely endorse the stereotypes that are held about them by majority group members (Lee & Ottati, 1993, 1995). African Americans and Latino Americans often subscribe to negative cultural stereotypes about each other and themselves (Jost & Banaji, 1994). More recent work by Cuddy et al. (2009),

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across 10 nations, found that collectivist cultural groups, in general, differ from individualist groups in their weaker endorsement of positive ingroup stereotypes. In sum, ingroup disfavoring tendencies have been observed in various groups and appear to be particularly prevalent in East Asian cultures.

Causal Origins of Ingroup Derogation

Even less research has examined the causal origins of ingroup derogation. Since the bulk of the literature has focused on disadvantaged and minority groups, the causal explanations put forth have primarily emphasized sociological factors (e.g., nationalism and cultural oppression; Fine & Bowers, 1984; Hewstone & Ward, 1985; Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996), system justification, and the belief in a just world (Jost & Burgess, 2000). Although the system justification model has received substantial empirical support, this paradigm possesses several limitations as a causal explanation for all forms of ingroup derogation. According to this model, minorities subscribe to negative views about their group in ways that justify the status quo and their group's occupation of an inferior social position, thereby affirming their belief in a just, predictable world. Consequently, ingroup derogation should be limited to dimensions that are status relevant (e.g., intelligence) but not status irrelevant (e.g., honesty; Jost & Burgess, 2000; Skevington, 1981). In other words, the anti-us tendency demonstrated by minorities should not exist as a general, pervasive negative posture toward ingroup members. Consistent with this hypothesis, the system justification literature has shown a trend toward status-relevant ingroup derogation (e.g., Rudman & Kilianski, 2000). Nevertheless, although system justification provides a plausible explanation for some forms of ingroup derogation, especially derogation involving hierarchical social categories (e.g., ethnicity, gender), it does not explain ingroup derogation among majority group members, nor does it explain more generic ingroup derogation that is status irrelevant.

Notably, anti-us tendencies have been documented among *majority* group members in East Asian cultures. East Asian (Japanese) participants, *relative* to North Americans, often rate their relationships, romantic partners, and friends less favorably (Endo, Heine, & Lehman, 2000; Heine & Lehman, 1997), and report less positive attitudes and beliefs about their universities, cities, countries (Cuddy et al., 2009; Diener, Suh, Smith, & Shao, 1995; Endo et al., 2000), and even sports teams (Snibbe, Kitayama, Markus, & Suzuki, 2003). Rather than system justifying, these findings point to possible cultural differences in the origin of ingroup disfavoring tendencies.

The only nonsociological explanation offered for ingroup-disfavoring tendencies among certain cultural groups comes from the notion that attitudes toward the ingroup may simply be an extension of attitudes toward the self: Just as members of collectivist cultures are less enhancing of the self than those of individualist cultures, they should also be less enhancing of their cultural group (Cuddy et al., 2009; Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, & Peng, 2010). Indeed, one of the major explanations for East Asians' greater negativity toward the self is their greater dialecticism (Boucher, Peng, Shi, & Wang, 2009; Spencer-Rodgers, Peng, Wang, & Hou, 2004)—an explanation we propose also applies to ingroups.

Cultural Differences in Ingroup Favoritism

Ingroup derogation also has been conceptualized by Western scholars as a Freudian "group inferiority complex" or pathological self-hatred (for a review, see Jost & Burgess, 2000, p. 293). However, this depiction represents a largely Western characterization. As with self-derogation (Heine & Hamamura, 2007), ingroup derogation may be more culturally normative and less troubling for East Asians. East Asians possess "dialectical selves" and view the self as a more holistic, changeable, and internally inconsistent entity than do European Americans (Spencer-Rodgers & Peng, 2004). East Asians typically exhibit greater "ambivalence" or evaluative contradiction in their self-attitudes (Boucher et al., 2009; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004); they do not strive for positive self-esteem, at least not in the same manner as do North Americans (Heine & Hamamura, 2007); and self-derogation is not inevitably associated with psychological maladjustment (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). These parallel findings in the domain of self-perception challenge the conceptualization of ingroup derogation as a psychopathological phenomenon.

The present research seeks to unpack the anti-us paradox via an as yet unexplored angle: lay beliefs. Previous studies have reliably demonstrated that East Asians subscribe to distinct lay theories about the nature of the world. In contrast to the Aristotelian, linear logic employed by their Western counterparts, East Asians embrace the dialectical concepts of contradiction, change, and holism (Peng & Nisbett, 1999; Spencer-Rodgers, Williams, et al., 2010). Individuals with dialectical lay beliefs are more accepting of seeming contradiction and emphasize both the good and bad in self (Boucher et al., 2009; Choi & Choi, 2002; Spencer-Rodgers, Boucher, Mori, Wang, & Peng, 2009; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004). Consequently, they might exhibit greater negativity toward a wide range of attitude objects, including important ingroups and their members. If contradictory elements coexist in all things at all times, as suggested by the principle of contradiction (yin and yang), then positive and negative elements must also coexist in valued social objects. We posit that East Asians' dialectical tendency to embrace opposing sides when they reason about an issue (i.e., the negative along with the positive) produces a seemingly counterintuitive phenomenon whereby they tend to emphasize the unfavorable aspects of their ingroups. However, we further postulate that the dialectical tendency to acknowledge the unfavorable

characteristics of one's ingroups does not necessarily translate into deep-rooted negative feelings toward those groups.

Multiple Levels of Ingroup Attitudes

Another purpose of this research was to examine ingroup attitudes across levels of analysis and to distinguish between explicit and implicit, as well as cognitive and affective, ingroup attitudes (i.e., *beliefs* vs. *feelings* about ingroups). Historically, research on ingroup derogation has relied almost exclusively on explicit measures such as attribution tasks, stereotype ratings, and doll preferences. More recently, scholars have tapped the unconscious nature of these attitudes and have found that implicit associations often differ from, or even contradict, explicit self-report avowals (Devine, 1989; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002a, 2002b). People's cognitions and emotions also may differ markedly toward a variety of attitude objects (Crites, Fabrigar, & Petty, 1994; Esses & Dovidio, 2002). A more nuanced investigation of anti-us tendencies may be especially important in East Asian cultures, where past research has shown there are greater expected discrepancies between attitudinal components (i.e., people's thoughts, feelings, and behaviors; Kashima, Siegal, Tanaka, & Kashima, 1992). Because of their dialectical lay beliefs and greater tolerance of contradiction, the distinction between explicit and implicit attitudes, and cognitive and affective orientations, may be especially pronounced in East Asian cultures. For example, it is plausible that East Asians hold derogatory explicit beliefs but not negative implicit emotions toward their ingroups.

Summary of Predictions

If ingroup attitudes derive, in part, from dialectical lay beliefs, then ingroup disfavoring tendencies should be more prevalent in a prototypical dialectal culture (in this case, Chinese) than nondialectical cultures (European Americans, Latinos). We further expected that these effects would depend somewhat on the domain and level of analysis. Specifically, we predicted that ingroup-disfavoring tendencies would be less pronounced among Chinese in the family domain (Study 1) than in the ethnic group domain (Studies 2 and 3) given the salience and importance of one's family relative to one's ethnicity. Moreover, because dialecticism is a lay belief system (Spencer-Rodgers & Peng, 2004), it should generally influence one's cognitions more than one's affective orientation toward ingroup members (Study 2). Thus, ingroup-disfavoring tendencies among Chinese do not necessarily reflect deep-rooted negative ingroup feelings. In Study 3, we tested the causal link between dialecticism and ingroup attitudes by priming dialectical versus linear lay beliefs and subsequently measuring ingroup attitudes.

Importantly, in the present research, our focus was on cultural differences in ingroup ratings rather than "ingroup derogation" per se. In classic social psychological research, ingroup derogation is said to occur only when people make judgments that favor an outgroup over an ingroup and there is a clear intergroup comparison or context (e.g., Bond & Hewstone, 1988). Although we report whether participants favored the ingroup relative to an outgroup in Studies 2 and 3, our primary interest was in cultural differences in attitudes toward various ingroups (independent of attitudes toward outgroups) and the cultural underpinnings of these attitudes.

Study 1

Study 1 examined whether Chinese participants would demonstrate less ingroup favoritism, compared to European Americans, on an explicit level in the domain of family. We chose this ingroup for several reasons. First, the concept of "family" is relatively universal, and second, families are known to occupy an especially prominent role in East Asian cultures (Kim, Li, & Ng, 2005). We asked members of two majority groups, mainland Chinese and European Americans, to rate their closest family members on positive and negative traits selected from all aspects of the Big Five (Costa & McCrae, 1992). In accordance with our dialecticism hypothesis, we predicted that Chinese participants would be more negative in their judgments of their closest family members than would European Americans.

Method

Participants and Procedure. One hundred and one Chinese (51 women; M_{age} = 20.8) students at Peking University and 95 European American (66 women; M_{age} = 20.2) students at the University of California (UC), Berkeley, completed the measures as part of a larger cross-cultural study. No explicit references to ethnicity or culture were made to minimize demand characteristics and suspicion about cross-group comparisons.

Measures. Participants were instructed: "Take a moment to think about the family member that you are closest to. This could be your mother, father, sister, brother, grandmother, or any other member of your family."[1] Participants subsequently rated the extent to which 16 contrasting attributes were typical of that person, on a 1 (*not at all characteristic*) to 9 (*very characteristic*) scale. The list included a variety of status-relevant and status-irrelevant traits: self-sacrificing/self-centered, inventive/unimaginative, loyal/undependable, sociable/shy, dominant/submissive, intelligent/foolish, obedient/rebellious, and organized/disorganized. Mean positive trait scores (Cronbach's alphas = .69 and .76 for Chinese and European Americans, respectively) and negative trait scores (Cronbach's alphas = .73 and .79 for Chinese and European Americans, respectively) were computed for each participant.

Results and Discussion

No main effects or interactions involving gender were found on the measures.

A repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on the trait scores using type of trait and culture as the factors. There was a significant main effect of type of trait. Both cultures rated their family members higher on positive than negative traits, $F(1, 194) = 525.43$, $p < .001$, indicating that both cultures were ingroup favoring in absolute terms. Chinese rated their family members more positively ($M = 5.59$) than negatively ($M = 3.78$), $t(100) = 13.19$, $p < .001$, as did European Americans ($M_{pos} = 6.54$, $M_{neg} = 3.40$), $t(94) = 18.66$, $p < .001$. However, this main effect was qualified by a significant Type of Trait × Culture interaction, $F(1, 194) = 37.84$, $p < .001$.

We examined the simple effect of culture for each type of trait separately. Chinese ($M = 3.78$) rated their closest family members higher on the negative traits than did European Americans ($M = 3.40$), $F(1, 194) = 8.10$, $p < .01$. Likewise, Chinese ($M = 5.59$) rated their family members lower on the positive traits than did European Americans ($M = 6.54$), $F(1, 194) = 58.78$, $p < .001$. Thus, Chinese were significantly less ingroup favoring than were European Americans.

As predicted, the dialectical cultural group (Chinese) held significantly less positive explicit attitudes toward their family members compared to the nondialectical cultural group (European Americans). These findings are notable given that participants in both cultures are majority group members in their respective countries, and hence, the results cannot be explained by the system justification model. These results are consistent with previous research that shows that, in *absolute* terms, Japanese rate their relationships more positively than negatively, but that in *relative* terms, they are less ingroup favoring than North Americans (Endo et al., 2000).

Study 2

Study 2 sought to expand the scope of our investigation in several ways. First, we selected a broader ingroup—one's ethnic group—to examine the generalizability of our findings across domains. Second, we expanded our participant sample to include an additional, nondialectical cultural group: Latinos. This minority group allowed us to address the question of whether ingroup-disfavoring tendencies are more pronounced among East Asians (given their dialectical lay beliefs) or whether they are merely epiphenomenal with minority status, as other paradigms such as system justification theory would predict. Third, we directly measured dialecticism via the Dialectical Self Scale (DSS; Spencer-Rodgers, Srivastava, et al., 2010) and examined other potential variables that could account for ingroup attitudes: socioeconomic status (SES) and acculturation. We anticipated that dialecticism would be a potent predictor of ingroup attitudes.

In Study 2, we also included a measure of implicit ingroup attitudes. In accordance with our dialecticism hypothesis and previous research with East Asians (Bond & Hewstone, 1988; Hewstone & Ward, 1985; Jahoda et al., 1972; Snibbe et al., 2003), we predicted that Chinese participants would demonstrate less explicit ingroup favoritism than the nondialectical cultural groups. To our knowledge, no prior studies have tested whether this phenomenon occurs on an implicit level as well. However, previous work on the related topic of the self has found that people from collectivistic cultures show more favorable implicit than explicit self-esteem (Kitayama & Karasawa, 1997). In the same way that the use of implicit measures has provided a more nuanced understanding of self-related judgments cross-culturally, so to should it provide insight into ingroup-related judgments. Therefore, we conducted a more thorough investigation by measuring participants' implicit (cognitive vs. affective) associations.

By including two minority groups that occupy different social positions and are subject to distinct stereotypes in the United States (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998), the present design further allowed us to test the system justification paradigm against our alternative dialecticism hypothesis. According to system justification theory, ingroup derogation should be more pronounced in the ethnic group with lower social status, in this case, Latinos, and less evident among Chinese, since East Asians hold the position of the "model" (higher status) minority within contemporary American society (Sue & Okazaki, 1990). In contrast, from the vantage point of our dialecticism hypothesis, ingroup-disfavoring tendencies should follow the opposite pattern: Chinese, who are dialectical, should ingroup derogate the most, whereas Latinos, who are relatively nondialectical (Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004), should ingroup derogate to a markedly less degree. Because European Americans are nondialectical majority group members, we expected them to exhibit strong ingroup favoritism.

The Implicit Association Test (IAT) is a useful measure for tapping attitudes toward ethnic ingroups for several reasons. First, the IAT allowed us to examine ingroup attitudes on an automatic level, and hence, it is less prone to self-presentation effects. Second, the IAT demonstrates good psychometric properties (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) and it allowed us to tease apart cognitive versus affective associations. Finally, the previous literature has shown that the IAT effectively assesses unconscious associations rather than simply one's familiarity with the stimulus terms or mainstream social norms (Dasgupta, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2003). To compare participants' implicit attitudes and their familiarity with mainstream cultural stereotypes, we administered a stereotype rating scale that assessed positive and negative stereotypic beliefs (e.g., "Asians are intelligent"; Dixon & Rosenbaum, 2004; Wilson, 1996).

Method

Participants. Two hundred and ninety-one students (200 women; M_{age} = 20.8) from UC Berkeley and City College of San Francisco participated either for course credit, a fruit smoothie, or $10. Of the 291 participants, 67 identified as European American (52 women; M_{age} = 22.3), 100 as Latino/Latina (66 women; M_{age} = 20.8), and 124 as Chinese (82 women; M_{age} = 19.8).

Procedure. Upon arrival, participants were told they were participating in a study on "how college students perceive and respond to different social situations." They then completed the following (in order): attribution task, stereotype ratings, DSS, and a demographics form. Afterward, they completed two IATs (cognitive, affective) in random order.

Measures

Attribution task. In this study, we included an open-ended attribution task. Following Hewstone and Ward (1985), participants were presented with two scenarios describing the negative behavior of either an ingroup or outgroup target. To reduce suspicion, the test scenarios were interspersed with three distracter scenarios. The test scenarios included: (a) a vendor cheated the participant on a food purchase, and (b) a stranger insulted the participant after the participant mistook him for someone else. The ethnicity of the target within each scenario was counterbalanced. Following each scenario, participants were asked to explain the target's negative behavior: (a) "How would you describe the other character in the scenario?" and (b) "How would you explain why the other character behaved in the way s/he did?"

Implicit attitudes. We administered two separate IATs to assess unconscious cognitive versus affective associations. We adapted the IAT originally developed and validated by Nosek et al. (2002a).[2] We administered a relatively cognitive IAT that assessed beliefs about the characteristics of ingroup and outgroup members and included personality-related words (e.g., *intelligent*). The word list included both status-relevant and status-irrelevant traits. We also administered a more affective IAT that measured emotional associations and included emotionally charged words (e.g., *joy*) that were unrelated to personality content. Both IATs exhibited acceptable reliability (Cronbach's alphas = .68 and .76 for the cognitive and affective IATs, respectively). The IAT and related measures of implicit attitudes have been successfully modified to measure emotional associations (see Huijding & de Jong, 2006; Schmukle & Egloff, 2006) and are correlated with emotional responding, including amygdala activation (Phelps et al., 2000). These findings suggest that the IAT can be adapted to measure both affective and cognitive associations.

Both IATs used ethnic names as the stimuli (e.g., Zhang, Sanchez, Smith), modeled after the IATs tapping racial/ethnic attitudes used by Nosek et al. (2002a). For European American participants, the outgroup stimuli consisted of Chinese names; for Chinese and Latino participants, the outgroup consisted of European American names.

Each IAT consisted of five blocks: Blocks 1, 2, and 4 served as practice rounds; Blocks 3 and 5 were the test (compatible and incompatible) rounds. In the test rounds, participants were asked to either associate positive words with ingroup names and negative words with outgroup names (compatible associations) or negative words with ingroup names and positive words with outgroup names (incompatible associations). Response times were measured in milliseconds. The representative keys (L/S), block order, and IAT order were all counterbalanced.

Stereotype ratings. To examine participants' familiarity with and endorsement of mainstream cultural stereotypes, we asked them to complete a series of attribute ratings. Following Hewstone and Ward (1985), participants rated both their ingroup and one outgroup on a set of six trait pairs conventionally associated with the target groups (Dixon & Rosenbaum, 2004; Wilson, 1996). The traits were presented on bipolar scales ranging, for example, (a) from 1 (*unintelligent*) to 5 (*intelligent*). The other traits included: (b) lazy–hardworking, (c) unattractive–attractive, (d) follower–leader, (e) not committed to family–committed to family, and (f) unmasculine–masculine (with respect to men within the group). European Americans rated their own ethnic group (i.e., "Whites in general") and Chinese (i.e., "Asians in general"). Both Chinese and Latino participants rated their own ethnic group (e.g., "Latinos in general") and European Americans.[3]

Stereotype scores were then calculated by subtracting the outgroup ratings from the ingroup ratings. For example, if a European American participant assigned a 5 to the target group Asians for the trait *intelligent* and a 4 to the target group Whites, he or she received a stereotype score of –1 for that trait pair. Thus, a negative score reflects a lower rating of the ingroup on the attribute relative to the outgroup. These procedures were repeated for the six trait pairs. A mean stereotype score was then computed for each of the six trait pairs separately. The results are presented by ethnicity in Table 1.

Dialecticism. We included the DSS (Spencer-Rodgers, Srivastava, et al., 2010) as a measure of dialecticism. Participants rated their agreement, on a scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*), with statements such as: "When I hear two sides of an argument, I often agree with both" and "I sometimes believe two things that contradict each other." The DSS has been shown to possess adequate cross-cultural validity and reliability (Hamamura, Heine, & Paulhus, 2008; Spencer-Rodgers, Srivastava, et al., 2010). Cronbach's alphas were .88, .81, and .77 for European Americans, Latinos, and Chinese, respectively.

Socioeconomic status. Participants indicated their permanent zip code (home). Thus, SES was operationalized in terms of the average family income of the participants' hometown based on the U.S. 2000 Census data.

Table 1. Means and Standard Deviations for Stereotype Ratings by Ethnicity

Ingroup rating – outgroup rating	Participant group					
	Chinese		Latinos		European Americans	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Intelligent	0.73**	0.77	–0.26**	0.63	–0.56**	0.70
Hardworking	1.28**	1.08	1.02**	1.33	–0.78**	1.04
Attractive	–0.45**	0.97	0.37**	1.20	0.49**	0.86
Leader	–1.04**	1.24	–0.48**	1.21	0.45**	0.99
Committed to family	1.42**	1.32	2.02**	1.33	–1.00**	1.05
Masculine (for males)	–1.07**	0.97	0.94**	1.09	0.82**	0.96

Significance levels indicate a significant difference from zero. Negative scores reflect a lower rating of the ingroup on the attribute relative to the outgroup; positive scores reflect a higher rating of the ingroup on the attribute relative to the outgroup.
**$p < .01$, two-tailed.

Acculturation. Acculturation was operationalized as whether the participant was a first-generation immigrant or not.

Results

None of the effects reported here were related to gender except the attribution task. There was a main effect for gender, $F(1, 275) = 6.73$, $p < .05$. However, because there was no Culture × Gender interaction, we combined women and men.

Attribution task. The open-ended responses on the attribution task were coded by two independent coders ($\alpha = .98$) on a scale ranging from 1 (*entirely internal attribution*) to 5 (*entirely external attribution*). An ingroup attribution score was computed for each participant by averaging the ratings for the two questions about the ingroup actor's behavior in the two test scenarios. The same procedures were used to compute an outgroup attribution score. An overall attribution score was then computed for each participant by calculating the difference between the ingroup and outgroup scores. A positive score reflects ingroup favoritism (i.e., participants attribute the ingroup actor's negative behaviors to external circumstances and the outgroup actor's negative behaviors to internal traits). A negative score reflects ingroup derogation.

We conducted one-sample *t* tests to determine whether participants' overall attribution scores were significantly different from zero. Chinese were significantly ingroup derogating ($M = –0.93$), $t(118) = –5.61$, $p < .001$ (see Figure 1). Both European Americans ($M = 0.20$), $t(59) < 1$, and Latinos ($M = 0.28$), $t(89) = 1.48$, $p = .14$, were ingroup favoring, but not significantly so. Hence, only Chinese showed explicit ingroup derogation on the attribution task.

Next, we examined whether the ethnic groups differed from each other. A one-way ANOVA showed significant differences among the three ethnic groups, $F(2, 261) = 13.49$, $p < .001$. Post hoc analyses (Tukey's honestly significant difference [HSD]) indicated significant differences between Chinese and European Americans ($M_{diff} = –1.12$), $p < .001$, as well as Latinos ($M_{diff} = –1.20$), $p < .001$. European Americans and Latinos did not differ from each other ($M_{diff} = 0.08$, *ns*). Hence, Chinese showed more negative explicit attributions than did European Americans and Latinos.



Figure 1. Mean scores for attribution task by ethnicity

Implicit attitudes. Analysis of the IAT data followed standard procedures for response latencies (see Greenwald et al., 1998): we normalized participants' responses: short (< 300) and long (> 3,000) responses were recoded as 300 and 3,000 ms, respectively, and error responses were removed. We then conducted a reciprocal transformation by dividing the responses by 1,000. This converted the latencies into speed scores, with higher values indicating faster responses.

We computed IAT scores by calculating the difference between the mean speeds for the compatible (e.g., *Zhang* with *good* for Chinese participants) and incompatible (e.g., *Zhang* with *bad* for Chinese participants) blocks. A positive IAT score reflects ingroup favoritism, whereas a negative score reflects ingroup derogation.

Cognitive-IAT scores. We first conducted one-sample *t* tests to determine whether the cognitive-IAT scores were significantly different from zero. Chinese showed significant ingroup derogation ($M = –0.064$), $t(123) = –3.77$, $p < .001$ (see Figure 2). European Americans demonstrated significant ingroup favoritism ($M = 0.20$), $t(66) = 8.73$, $p < .001$. Latinos emerged in the middle: They were neither ingroup derogating nor favoring ($M = 0.027$), $t(99) = 1.91$, *ns*.

Next, we examined whether the ethnic groups differed from each other. A one-way ANOVA revealed significant differences among the three ethnic groups, $F(2, 288) = 44.76$, $p < .001$. Chinese differed significantly from European Americans ($M_{diff} = 0.27$), $p < .001$, and Latinos ($M_{diff} = 0.09$), $p < .001$. Latinos and European Americans also differed significantly ($M_{diff} = 0.17$), $p < .001$. Hence, Chinese



Figure 2. Mean cognitive-IAT and affective-IAT scores by ethnicity
IAT = Implicit Association Test.

participants held more negative implicit cognitions than did European Americans and Latinos.

Affective-IAT scores. One-sample *t* tests were conducted (see Figure 2). Chinese emerged in the middle: They were neither ingroup derogating nor favoring ($M = 0.007$), $t(123) < 1$. European Americans again demonstrated significant ingroup favoritism ($M = 0.18$), $t(66) = 8.08$, $p < .001$. Latinos also were ingroup favoring ($M = 0.040$), $t(99) = 1.51$, $p < .10$, although the latter effect only approached significance. Thus, Chinese participants were not affectively ingroup derogating, in absolute terms.

A one-way ANOVA once again revealed significant differences among the three ethnic groups, $F(2, 288) = 16.01$, $p < .001$. There were significant differences between Chinese and European Americans ($M_{diff} = 0.10$), $p < .001$, but not Latinos ($M_{diff} = –0.033$, *ns*). Latinos and European Americans differed from each other ($M_{diff} = 0.14$), $p < .001$. Thus, in relative terms, Chinese showed less favorable implicit emotions toward their ethnic group than did European Americans.

Comparison of cognitive-IAT and affective-IAT scores. We also examined whether participants' cognitive-IAT and affective-IAT scores differed significantly from each other. These scores did not differ for European Americans, $t(66) < 1$, *ns*, or Latinos, $t(99) < 1$, *ns*. However, we found that for Chinese, the cognitive-IAT and affective-IAT scores differed significantly from each other, $t(123) = 3.04$, $p < .01$. Only Chinese demonstrated a marked difference between their unconscious cognitive and affective associations.

We also examined the correlations between the cognitive-IAT scores (and affective-IAT scores) and the attribution scores to investigate whether the implicit and explicit measures tapped distinct psychological processes. As expected, the cognitive-IAT and affective-IAT scores were uncorrelated with the attribution scores (*r*s = .068 and .035, respectively, both *ns*). This is consistent with previous research on implicit and explicit views of a related construct, the self, which has found the two types of measures to be weakly related at best (e.g., Bosson, Swann, & Pennebaker, 2000; Koole & Pelham, 2003; Spalding & Hardin, 1999).

To summarize, the Chinese participants exhibited significant and negative implicit beliefs (cognitive ingroup derogation) but not implicit emotions toward their ethnic group (affective ingroup derogation). European American participants showed significant ingroup favoritism on both the cognitive- and affective-IATs. Latino participants' cognitive- and affective-IAT scores were not significantly different from zero.

Stereotype ratings. All three ethnic groups endorsed the stereotypes that society at large holds about them (see Table 1). We conducted *t* tests comparing the stereotype scores to zero. All *t* tests were significant (*p*s < .01). For example, both Chinese and European Americans rated Asians as less attractive and lower in leadership than European Americans, and both ascribed to the view of Asian men as less masculine than European American men. Likewise, both ethnic groups endorsed the stereotypic view of Asians as more intelligent, hardworking, and committed to family. Latino participants rated fellow Latinos as less intelligent and lower in leadership than European Americans. These findings suggest that members of all three ethnic groups are familiar with and endorsed the cultural stereotypes that are prevalent in American society.

Dialecticism. A one-way ANOVA revealed significant differences among the three ethnic groups on dialecticism, $F(2, 288) = 8.51$, $p < .001$. Chinese ($M = 4.25$) scored significantly higher than European Americans ($M = 3.76$), $t(189) = –4.11$, $p < .001$, and marginally higher than Latinos ($M = 4.08$), $t(222) = –1.64$, $p = .10$. The latter two groups also differed significantly from each other, $t(165) = 2.54$, $p < .05$.

Socioeconomic status. The three groups differed in terms of their annual average (hometown) household income, $F(2, 251) = 5.17$, $p < .01$. Chinese ($M = \$76{,}058$) came from neighborhoods whose average annual household income was significantly higher than that of Latinos ($M = \$62{,}959$), $t(1, 185) = 2.80$, $p < .01$. No other group differences approached significance.

Acculturation. The two minority groups, Chinese and Latinos, differed in terms of generational status, with more Chinese being first-generation immigrants than Latinos, $t(1, 134) = 2.41$, $p < .05$.

Correlational analyses. Since the previous results revealed that ingroup derogation occurred on the cognitive-IAT, but not the affective-IAT, among Chinese, we examined the relation between the predictor variables (dialecticism, SES, and acculturation) and cognitive ingroup derogation. First, we collapsed across the three ethnic groups. The first column of Table 2 shows that dialecticism was significantly related to more negative implicit (cognitive) ingroup attitudes, $r = –.23$, $p < .001$. Overall, SES and acculturation were not significant predictors.

Table 2. Relation Between Psychological-Sociological Variables and Cognitive-IAT Scores by Ethnicity

	Overall	Chinese	Latinos	European Americans
Predictor	*r*	*r*	*r*	*r*
Dialecticism	–0.23***	–0.16†	–0.19†	–0.04
Socioeconomic status	–0.01	0.01	0.02	0.12
Acculturation	0.07	0.06	–0.05	N/A

A negative correlation indicates the predictor variable is associated with lower cognitive-IAT scores and, therefore, less positive ingroup attitudes.
IAT = Implicit Association Test.
†$p < .10$. ***$p < .001$.

Subsequently, when we broke down the data into the separate ethnic groups, a similar, albeit more nuanced, pattern emerged. Among the two minority groups (Chinese, Latinos), dialecticism was a marginally significant predictor of ingroup attitudes: for the Chinese sample, $r = -.16$, $p < .10$, and Latino sample, $r = -.19$, $p < .10$. The correlations approached, but did not reach, significance, which is not surprising given the smaller size and hence lower statistical power of the separate samples.

Discussion

Consistent with our dialecticism hypothesis, across the various measures employed in Study 2 we found that Chinese were the least ingroup favoring. European Americans, in contrast, were significantly ingroup favoring, and Latinos demonstrated no strong preference in either direction. Thus, ingroup derogation was generally more pronounced in the prototpyical dialectical group (Chinese) relative to a prototypical nondialectical group (European Americans), which is consistent with the notion that ingroup derogation derives, in part, from culturally based lay beliefs. Study 2 further supported our hypothesis that dialecticism is an important predictor of ingroup attitudes. Collapsing across groups, and within the Chinese and Latino samples (the two groups that demonstrated ingroup derogation and ingroup neutrality, respectively), dialecticism was marginally or significantly related to more negative ingroup attitudes.

Study 2 also provided partial support for, and highlighted some of the limitations of, the system justification paradigm as a generic explanation for ingroup derogation. That is, when we simply examine differences between the European majority and Latino minority (or Chinese minority), we find highly pronounced ingroup favoritism among European Americans, which is consistent with system justification theory. Latinos (and Chinese) were significantly less ingroup favoring than European Americans on the implicit measures, and they endorsed negative cultural stereotypes about their group.[4] The limitation of this model, however, comes when we compare the two minority groups. Once Chinese are introduced into the picture, the pattern no longer holds. Chinese participants exhibited less favorable ingroup attitudes than Latinos, even though they constitute the higher status minority. Thus, ingroup-disfavoring tendencies were not simply epiphenomenal with minority status. Moreover, the Chinese participants did not simply exhibit "strategic" ingroup enhancement on status-irrelevant traits (e.g., Spears & Manstead, 1989). Rather, our findings demonstrate that an East Asian minority showed less ingroup favoritism across a multitude of traits, both status relevant and status irrelevant.

The finding of ingroup derogation among Chinese on an explicit level (attribution task) replicates previous findings by Hewstone and Ward (1985) conducted with Chinese in Malaysia and reveals that, two decades later, attributional anti-us tendencies are prevalent among Chinese (in this case, in the United States). These findings are notable given that Chinese college students tend to be well educated and of high SES. Although ingroup derogation was observed on the cognitive-IAT among Chinese, importantly, on an implicit affective level, it was not. These findings suggest that derogatory beliefs or judgments about one's ingroups do not necessarily translate into negative feelings toward those groups. By teasing apart the cognitive versus affective components of ingroup attitudes, we found that Chinese were the only ethnic group to show a significant difference between their cognitive- and affective-IAT scores.

One of the strengths of Study 2 is that we directly measured the antecedent variable of interest (dialecticism) and showed that dialecticism is related to negative implicit cognitions. However, because the study was correlational, it fell short in demonstrating that dialecticism actually leads to ingroup derogation. Therefore, in Study 3 we experimentally manipulated dialecticism and measured its effect on ingroup attitudes.

Study 3

Study 3 sought to examine the causal link between lay theories (dialectical vs. linear) and ingroup attitudes. We manipulated people's lay beliefs by presenting participants with a fabricated scientific article in support of either dialectical or linear (Aristotelian) logic, and we subsequently measured ingroup attitudes in the domain of ethnicity. We predicted that the dialectical prime would be associated with less ingroup favoritism.

Method

Participants and Procedure. Ninety-six students (63 women; $M_{age} = 19.9$) from UC Berkeley participated for course credit; 55 self-identified as Chinese (22 men; $M_{age} = 19.8$) and 41 as European American (11 men; $M_{age} = 20.2$). As a cover story, participants were told that the purpose of the study was to examine "how college students process and assimilate new

information, particularly in the domain of recent scientific findings."

We primed dialecticism following other research that has primed similar cultural constructs, such as independent–interdependent self-construals (e.g., White, Lehman, & Cohen, 2005). Participants were randomly assigned to read a page-long (fabricated) *ScienceNOW* news article that promoted either a nondialectical, linear orientation ("Aristotle Was Right: Truth Is Truth") or a dialectical orientation ("Aristotle Got It All Wrong"; excerpt below). Each article contained a brief description of the dialectical or linear orientation followed by a series of "findings" demonstrating why the particular orientation is adaptive:

> A new series of cross-cultural studies have demonstrated that Eastern dialectical thinking emerges as an . . . accurate view of reality. In simple terms, dialecticism is grounded on the key principles that: 1) everything is always in constant flux, as reality itself is a process; 2) reality is not precise or cut-and-dried, but rather full of contradiction; and 3) nothing is isolated and independent, but rather everything is connected.
>
> Currently, researchers . . . are examining the implications of such a paradigm shift in our conceptions of what is reasonable, logical, and functional. A group of professors and Ph.D. candidates from the University of Michigan have found, for example, that individuals who consider multiple sides of the same issue during problem-solving tasks tend to perform better.

Participants were given 3 min to read and process the article. Subsequently, they were asked to write two to three paragraphs documenting evidence derived from their own lives in support of the argument they had read.

Measures. After the priming task, participants completed (in order) the same attribution task and cognitive-IAT as in Study 2 and several unrelated measures. We focused on the cognitive-IAT (Cronbach's alpha = .70) because: (a) Study 2 found that when implicit ingroup derogation did occur among Chinese, it occurred only on the cognitive-IAT, and (b) dialecticism predicted the cognitive-IAT scores. The measures were tailored to the particular ethnicity of the participant.

Results

No main effects or interactions involving gender were found on the measures.

Manipulation check. As a manipulation check, we examined whether participants correctly followed the directions they were given in the priming task. All participants wrote a minimum of two paragraphs in support of the argument they had read.

Attribution task. A two-way ANOVA was conducted on the attribution scores with prime and ethnicity as the factors



Figure 3. Effect of priming on attribution task

(see Figure 3). The main effect of prime was significant, $F(1, 87) = 5.21$, $p < .05$; participants in the dialectical prime condition ($M = –0.31$), regardless of ethnicity, were less ingroup favoring than those in the linear prime condition ($M = 0.57$; see Figure 3). There was no main effect of ethnicity, $F(1, 87) = 1.71$, *ns*, and no interaction, $F(1, 87) < 1$.

Implicit attitudes. We conducted a two-way ANOVA on the cognitive-IAT scores using prime and ethnicity as the factors. Although no priming or interaction effects emerged, Fs$(1, 95) < 1$, there was a significant effect of ethnicity, $F(1, 95) = 44.48$, $p < .001$. Consistent with Study 2, Chinese ($M = –0.068$) scored significantly lower on the cognitive-IAT than did European Americans ($M = 0.23$).

Replicating the results of Study 2, one-sample t tests indicated that Chinese ($M = –0.068$) were significantly ingroup derogating on the cognitive-IAT, $t(54) = –2.33$, $p < .05$. In contrast, European Americans ($M = 0.23$) were significantly ingroup favoring, $t(39) = 7.14$, $p < .001$. These results indicate that despite the prime, Chinese participants continued to demonstrate ingroup derogation on the cognitive-IAT, whereas European Americans continued to exhibit ingroup favoritism.

Discussion

Study 3 provided support for the causal link between our hypothesized cultural variable and ingroup attitudes. Participants primed with dialecticism were less ingroup favoring than those primed with linear lay beliefs, at least in terms of their explicit, attributional tendencies. Participants primed with linear lay beliefs showed the opposite effect. The finding that the dialectical prime induced a marked change in explicit attributions serves as substantial evidence that dialectical lay beliefs do indeed play a key causal role in determining ingroup attitudes.

In addition, these results point to the intractable nature of implicit attitudes. Despite our priming of dialectical and linear lay beliefs, Chinese continued to show significant ingroup derogation and European Americans continued to exhibit ingroup favoritism on the cognitive-IAT. Our explicit priming technique influenced controlled, cognitive processes (i.e., the attribution of behavior to internal or external factors) but not implicit associations with ingroups or outgroups. This finding is not surprising given that the IAT literature shows that implicit attitudes are less malleable than explicit attitudes (e.g., Gawronski & Stack, 2004; Gregg, Seibt, & Banaji, 2006). It is also possible that an implicit dialecticism prime would have yielded changes on the cognitive-IAT, as previous studies have found that implicit primes may influence IAT results (Dasgupta & Greenwald, 1999).

General Discussion

Members of East Asians cultures (Japan, China, and Malaysia) reliably demonstrate less ingroup favoritism, especially in comparison to Caucasians in England and the United States (Bond & Hewstone, 1988; Hewstone & Ward, 1985; Jahoda et al., 1972; Lee & Ottati, 1993, 1995; Snibbe et al., 2003). We proposed that lay beliefs (dialecticism) give rise to ingroup-disfavoring tendencies, especially among East Asians. We tested this hypothesis across multiple cultures/ethnicities, domains, and levels of analysis. Study 1 examined ingroup attitudes among Chinese and European Americans within the family domain. Chinese were significantly less positive, compared to European Americans, in their explicit ratings of their closest family members. Study 2 investigated ingroup attitudes in the domain of ethnicity among Chinese, Latinos, and European Americans. Only Chinese participants exhibited significant ingroup derogation. Ingroup derogation occurred cognitively (but not affectively), on both explicit and implicit levels, among Chinese. This study also showed that dialecticism (as assessed by the DSS) was significantly related to more negative ingroup attitudes. Study 3 primed different lay beliefs and revealed that individuals primed with dialecticism were ingroup derogating on the attributional task relative to participants primed with linear beliefs, thus pointing to the causal role of dialecticism in determining ingroup attitudes.

Ingroup Attitudes Among Chinese

In accordance with our dialecticism hypothesis, Chinese were less ingroup favoring than were European Americans across all three studies. They also tended to hold more negative ingroup attitudes than Latinos. These findings point to significant cultural variation in the tendency to enhance the ingroup, a trend that can be accounted for, in part, by the lay beliefs of its cultural members. At the same time, like many other psychological phenomena, ingroup attitudes among Chinese exhibit domain specificity. Within the relatively narrow but psychologically salient domain of family, Chinese were ingroup favoring in absolute terms. Because family members are highly valued and meaningful social objects, it is reasonable to expect that people will hold more positive attitudes toward their family than their ethnic group.

Dialecticism as an Additional Explanation for Ingroup Derogation

The system justification model (Jost & Banaji, 1994; O'Brien & Major, 2005) is one of the prevailing theories explaining why disadvantaged group members hold derogatory views of their fellow group members. Our findings both support this theory and point to several of its limitations as an overarching explanation for ingroup derogation. Consistent with system justification theory, across all three studies, European Americans (a majority group) were almost invariably the most ingroup favoring. With the exception of one measure (attribution task; Study 2), the Latino participants (a minority group) exhibited significantly less ingroup favoritism than European Americans, and they endorsed negative, status-relevant stereotypes about their group (e.g., lower in intelligence and leadership). These findings support the notion that minorities sometimes endorse system-justifying views of their group.

On the other hand, the system justification paradigm does not provide a plausible explanation for why mainland Chinese (a majority group) made more negative ingroup judgments than European Americans in Study 1 or why Chinese showed greater ingroup derogation than Latinos in Study 2. According to system justification theory, the lower the status of the group, the more individuals should ingroup derogate. Thus, Latinos should demonstrate greater ingroup derogation than Chinese, the "model minority" in American society (Sue & Okazaki, 1990). Our findings, however, revealed the opposite pattern: Chinese ingroup derogated the most, even though the Chinese participants came from higher SES neighborhoods than the Latino participants. In sum, system justification does not provide an overarching explanation for ingroup derogation among East Asians.

Multiple Levels of Ingroup Derogation

This research has gone beyond the previous literature to tease apart the explicit versus implicit and cognitive versus emotional components of ingroup attitudes. In accordance with prior studies (Bond & Hewstone, 1988; Hewstone & Ward, 1985; Jahoda et al., 1972; Lee & Ottati, 1993, 1995; Snibbe et al., 2003), we found evidence of significant ingroup derogation among Chinese but, importantly, only a cognitive and not an affective level. This cognitive–affective dichotomy is a noteworthy finding and parallels prior research showing that East Asians expect attitudinal

components to be distinct (Kashima et al., 1992) and hold more contradictory self-beliefs and self-evaluations (Choi & Choi, 2002; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2004; Spencer-Rodgers et al., 2009). Overall, these findings indicate that anti-us tendencies among Chinese do not constitute a form of "inverted racism," "self-hatred," or inward-directed psychopathology. Rather, the tendency to cast ingroup members in a relatively negative light is a far more complex phenomenon that appears to reflect lay beliefs that are culturally rooted.

Implications of Dialecticism

Our dialecticism findings have a number of implications for social psychological theory and research. First, they point to cross-cultural variation in the prevalence of ingroup derogation. Anti-us tendencies seem to be more pervasive in East Asian than European American and Latino cultures. More research is needed on ingroup derogation in other cultural groups (e.g., African and Middle Eastern groups). Second, there may be important cultural differences in the origin and nature of ingroup derogation. Rather than reflecting the attitudes of a dominant social group (external, societal factors), ingroup-disfavoring tendencies may derive from within-group factors such as cultural epistemologies (as shown in the present research), norms, and values. For example, as with self-derogation (Heine & Hamamura, 2007), ingroup derogation may mirror the East Asian norms of modesty and humility. Rather than constituting a "group inferiority complex," in this set of studies, we found ingroup derogation among Chinese to be a largely cognitive phenomenon that does not significantly involve negative implicit emotions. Finally, ingroup derogation may have different social and psychological consequences in different cultures. For East Asian cultural groups, ingroup evaluations may constitute a less potent source of self-esteem (Chen, Brockner, & Chen, 2002), and ingroup-disfavoring tendencies may have less serious consequences for the self and psychological well-being.

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Notes

1. We used parental terms because, whereas most individuals have a mother and/or father, there is more variance in siblings and extended family. This is particularly true for Chinese, given the one-child policy.
2. We modeled our Implicit Association Test (IAT) after the original version from Greenwald, McGhee, and Schwartz (1998). At the time the studies were designed, we were not aware of the revised IAT scoring algorithm (Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003). Consequently, we used the original algorithm given that we had only five blocks in our IAT (the revised algorithm is based on seven blocks). Given that we did not have the critical blocks necessary to use the new algorithm, we conducted our analysis using the original algorithm. The correlations between IAT scores obtained from the old versus new algorithm are high, generally .90 or above (A. Greenwald, personal communication, March 23, 2010).
3. We selected Asians and Whites as the outgroup targets because we were primarily interested in participants' perceptions of these groups.
4. Autostereotyping was prominent across all three ethnic groups; the groups appeared to be equally familiar with and inclined to endorse mainstream cultural stereotypes. And yet, despite a comparable degree of explicit cultural knowledge, significant differences were observed among the ethnic groups in terms of their implicit attitudes. These findings lend support to the notion that our IAT results do not simply reflect participants' familiarity with mainstream social norms but rather are indicative of their actual implicit attitudes.

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